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Abstract 
There has been a long debate about whether speculators are stabilizing 
or not. We consider a model where speculators have a stabilizing role 
in normal times, but may also provoke large risk panics. The very 
feature that makes  arbitrageurs liquidity providers in normal times, 
namely their tolerance of risk, enables a large increase in asset price 
risk during a financial panic. We show that a policy that discourages 
balance sheet risk reduces the magnitude of financial panics, as well 
as asset price risk in both normal and panic states. 
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There has been a long debate about whether speculators are stabilizing or not.
We consider a model where speculators have a stabilizing role in normal times,
but may also provoke large risk panics. The very feature that makes arbitrageurs
liquidity providers in normal times, namely their tolerance of risk, enables a large
increase in asset price risk during a ￿nancial panic. We show that a policy that
discourages balance sheet risk reduces the magnitude of ￿nancial panics, as well
as asset price risk in both normal and panic states.
Keywords: Asset Pricing, Risk Management, Leverage.
JEL codes: E44, G11, G18So-called arbitrageurs or speculative investors, such as hedge funds and invest-
ment banks, play an important role in ￿nancial markets. By responding aggres-
sively to expected return opportunities they provide liquidity in markets. Despite
this role there have been regular calls for regulation of these investors. The tradi-
tional argument is that their aggressive behavior may be destabilizing when com-
bined with imperfect information, expectational errors or herding. In the wake
of the 2007-8 global ￿nancial crisis, the argument for regulation has emphasized
systemic risk as these institutions are closely interconnected (e.g. Stephen Morris
and Hyun Song Shin, 2008).
In this paper we develop a di￿erent argument for regulation, which is also
connected to ￿nancial crises. Our focus is on asset price risk. The very feature
that makes arbitrageurs liquidity providers in normal times, namely their tolerance
of risk, enables a large increase in asset price risk during a ￿nancial panic (or even
in normal times if investors take the probability of a future panic into account).
We show that a policy that discourages balance sheet risk, the product of asset
price risk and leverage, reduces the magnitude of ￿nancial panics, as well as asset
price risk in both normal and panic states.
We reach this conclusion in the context of a model of \risk panics" that we
previously developed in Philippe Bacchetta, C￿ edric Tille and Eric van Wincoop
(2010), from hereon BTW. The model generates large self-ful￿lling shifts in asset
price risk, consistent with sharp surges in risk that have characterized recent ￿-
nancial crises. The VIX index quadrupled during the panic in the Fall of 2008 and
tripled during the Greek debt crisis in the Spring of 2010.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section I we brie￿y
describe the model of BTW. In section II we argue that equilibrium asset price
risk can be reduced by a policy that punishes overall balance sheet risk (risk about
net worth). It has the e￿ect of making investors, or ￿nancial institutions, more
risk-averse. Section III concludes.
1 A Brief Description of the Model
There are overlapping generations of two types of agents, households and investors.
We can think of investors as leveraged ￿nancial institutions. They are born with
an endowment that they invest in stocks and bonds. They are leveraged when
1their bond holding is negative. Households invest their endowment in bonds and
a riskfree household technology.
There is a stochastic i.i.d. dividend and, more importantly, persistent wealth
shocks. These relate to the initial endowments of investors. BTW consider shocks
that redistribute wealth between households and investors, but show that results
are similar when only investors are hit by wealth shocks. In terms of the 2007-2008
crisis we can relate these wealth shocks to losses associated with mortgage-backed
securities or other derivatives.
Leverage is denoted by ￿t and is equal to the fraction of wealth that investors







and the portfolio return is R
p
t+1 = ￿tRK;t+1 + (1 ￿ ￿t)Rt. Here Rt is the gross
interest rate on bonds, which is determined in equilibrium. The equity return is
RK;t+1 = (Qt+1 +At+1)=Qt, where Qt is the equity price and At+1 is the dividend.





This portfolio share is equal to the ratio of equity holdings relative to net worth,
which is ￿nancial leverage. The model is closed by equilibrium in the stock and
bond markets. The aggregate bond supply is zero. Equity market equilibrium
implies that ￿tWI;t = QtK, where WI;t is the initial endowment of investors and
K is the equity supply.











The dynamic equation (3) implies that Qt depends on vart(Qt+1). Even when we
rule out explosive rational bubbles, which can typically occur in forward-looking
di￿erence equations, there are multiple solutions to (3). If vart(Qt+1) is time
varying it increases the variability of Qt. Therefore, changes in perceived volatility
create volatility, which leads to multiplicity.
The only state variable in the model is ￿t, which a￿ects the initial wealth WI;t
of investors: WI;t = (1 ￿ ￿t) ￿ WI in the quadratic approximation. ￿t follows an
2autoregressive process. BTW show that there are three types of equilibria. One is
a regular fundamental equilibrium, where the equity price Qt depends on ￿t only
to the extent that ￿t impacts the wealth WI;t. The second type is a sunspot-like
equilibrium, where ￿t has the dual role of a fundamental that a￿ects the asset price
through wealth and as a coordination device for time-varying beliefs about risk.
This second role is entirely separate from its fundamental role. It even holds when
￿t is a pure sunspot that has no impact on wealth.
The sunspot-like equilibrium re￿ects a degree of freedom in the model with
respect to beliefs about risk. It is driven by the negative link between the current
asset price and risk about the future asset price in (3), which implies that risk about
the future asset price depends on uncertainty about future risk. This dynamic
mapping of risk into itself gives rise to the possibility of multiple equilibria related
to di￿erent beliefs about the process of risk.
Finally, there are switching equilibria in which there are switches, driven by a
Markov-process, between a low risk state (akin to the fundamental equilibrium)
and a high risk state (akin to a sunspot-like equilibrium). A risk panic involves a
switch to the high risk state. The panic is larger when the endowment of investors,
around which risk beliefs are coordinated in the sunspot-like equilibrium, is low.
During the panic the fundamental plays the role of a coordination device for a
sudden large increase in beliefs about risk.
For a particular parameterization where investors are substantially leveraged
(steady state leverage of about 4), BTW show that a risk panic implies a sharp
spike in risk (quadruples, as during the 2008 panic) and a sharp drop in the equity
price, market liquidity and ￿nancial leverage. The drop in leverage follows as
investors reduce their exposure to equity as a result of increased risk. This smaller
exposure in turn reduces market liquidity.
2 Regulating Asset Price Risk
While not explicit in the model, it is reasonable to assume that large asset price
volatility is undesirable as a result of its impact on the real economy. We therefore
ask what the government can do to limit equilibrium asset price risk. In particular,
we consider policy that discourages balance sheet risk, which is the same as risk
about future net worth and therefore risk about R
p
t+1. Speci￿cally, assume that
3the government imposes a tax ￿ on this risk, so that for every unit of initial wealth




t+1) rather than just R
p
t+1. They then maximize
(1) minus ￿ ￿ vart(R
p
t+1). This has the impact of raising the e￿ective risk aversion
from ￿ to ￿ + 2￿. A tax on balance sheet risk therefore has the e￿ect of making
investors more risk averse.
We assess the impact of the tax by solving the model for di￿erent rates of
risk aversion, using the parameterization of BTW. A lower rate of risk aversion
reduces asset price volatility in the fundamental equilibrium. The coe￿cients v
and V in the equilibrium log-asset price qt = ~ q ￿ v￿t ￿ V ￿2
t both decrease. This is
associated with the stabilizing role of leveraged investors as providers of liquidity.
Market liquidity increases and risk declines as we make investors more aggressive
by lowering their risk aversion. In this case the optimal policy involves a subsidy
of balance sheet risk (￿ < 0), making investors more leveraged.
Next consider the sunspot-like equilibrium. Lower risk aversion signi￿cantly
increases both v and V and raises asset price risk. Intuitively, lower risk aversion
implies that agents are less responsive to changes in risk. It is exactly because
investors are less responsive to risk that it is possible to have an equilibrium with
large time-variation in risk, leading to high asset price volatility. In this case
equilibrium asset price risk is reduced by taxing balance sheet risk (￿ > 0).
Finally consider the switching equilibrium discussed in BTW. In that case
low risk aversion increases risk in both the low and high risk states. The high
risk state becomes more volatile because of increased volatility in the sunspot-like
equilibrium. The low risk state becomes more volatile because most of the risk in
that state is connected to the possibility of a switch to the high risk state.
Table 1, which shows the equity price, risk, leverage, and liquidity in the switch-
ing equilibrium, illustrates these points. Risk is measured as the standard deviation
of Qt+1=Qt, taking into account the possibility of switching to another state. Lever-
age is equal to the share of equity in investors’ portfolio, ￿t. Finally, illiquidity is
measured as the absolute value of the derivative of the log equity price with respect
to ￿t. The ￿rst column shows the value of these variables prior to any shock (￿t is
at its unconditional mean and we are in the low risk state). The second column
shows the variables when an increase in ￿t cuts the wealth WI;t of investors in half,
while remaining in the low-risk state. We can think of this as the ￿rst year of
the 2007-8 crisis before the fall of Lehman Brothers. The last column shows what
4happens when we switch to the high risk state, with the investors’ endowment still
being low. The top panel uses the parameterization in BTW, where risk aversion
is ￿ = 1. The bottom panel increases risk aversion to 5.
Table 1 Role of Risk Aversion
prior to start of height crisis crisis panic
￿ = 1
equity price 100 85 37
risk 5.0 15.0 56.3
leverage 4.5 8.2 3.6
illiquidity 0.28 0.83 4.5
￿ = 5
equity price 100 96 84
risk 1.1 2.8 7.0
leverage 4.8 10.1 8.9
illiquidity 0.07 0.19 0.73
Higher risk aversion signi￿cantly reduces risk in all possible states. As a conse-
quence, higher risk aversion signi￿cantly dampens the decline in the equity price in
both the tranquil and panic stages of the crisis. Higher risk aversion also increases
market liquidity, as seen in the last row of Table 1. This may seem counterintuitive
as one might expect a less aggressive response to expected return changes to reduce
market liquidity. But the reduced risk under higher risk aversion leads to increased
leverage and therefore increased exposure to equity that improves market liquidity.
We conclude that less aggressive investors end up generating less risk and a more
liquid ￿nancial market. This provides a strong motivation for regulatory policy
that limits balance sheet risk.
Interestingly, the problem is not leverage itself. Prior to the crisis, leverage
is virtually the same for ￿ = 5 as for ￿ = 1, while it is substantially larger for
￿ = 5 during the height of the crisis. A higher rate of risk aversion by itself would
reduce leverage. But since it signi￿cantly reduces risk, it implies higher leverage
in equilibrium. What matters is not leverage itself, but overall balance sheet risk
vart(R
p
t+1), which is the product of "leverage" and "risk" in Table 1. Even though
the higher risk aversion leads to higher leverage, it reduces asset price risk by
enough to actually lower balance sheet risk.
53 Conclusion
There has been a long debate about whether speculators are stabilizing or not. We
consider a model where speculators have a stabilizing role in normal times, but
may also provoke large risk panics. The possibility of self-ful￿lling shifts in beliefs
about risk, consistent with large spikes in risk during recent ￿nancial crises, points
to the desirability of a policy limiting balance sheet risk, though not necessarily
leverage. This reduces the equilibrium level of asset price risk in both normal and
panic states and improves market liquidity.
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